Abstract. We present a two-in-one
Introduction
Visual cryptography ͑VC͒ was a sharing technique first proposed by Naor and Shamir 1 in 1994. According to their design, VC can share an image ͑for example, "Lena"͒ between two noisy transparencies ͑also known as shares͒. Then stacking these transparencies can unveil the input image directly using human vision without any computation. Many other VC systems [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] have been proposed since. On the other hand, there is another kind of tool to deal with sensitive data, namely, data hiding. [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] People can hide sensitive data in media; and later, the data can be extracted from these host media. Although there are many sophisticated VC systems ͑see Refs. 1-15͒, the reported works are seldom related to a VC design that, besides sharing to the input image ͑"Lena"͒, also hides a certain amount of data that are more private or more valuable than the input image itself ͑for example, Lena's address and other personal information͒. Therefore, we try to design in this paper a "two-in-one" VC scheme, which shares an image "Lena" of moderate confidentiality using two transparencies; and these two transparencies together can also extract a more confidential text data file describing the image "Lena." ͑More specifically, simply stacking the two transparencies can show the image "Lena" directly; meanwhile, after certain computations, one can also extract the more sensitive text data.͒ Of course, none of the transparencies alone can reveal anything about the image "Lena" or the more sensitive text.
There are several kinds of applications for this scheme. Perhaps the most direct application is to store or transmit an image of moderate confidentiality ͑for example, the photo of an employee, a suspect, or a VIP member͒ using the two generated transparencies, whose stacking together can yield the image. In addition, the background description of the image ͑for example, the employee's name, address, birthday, nationality, salary, and professional training͒ can be extracted only from joint information of the two transparencies by a high-ranking officer who knows the decoding key discussed in Sec. 4. As a result, if the two shares are collected, both of the lower rank officers and their commander can view the image; however, only the commander can decrypt the background text. Another application is to authenticate the transparencies generated by the VC system so that the combination containing faked transparencies can be identified, as discussed in Sec. 4 .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The method is stated in Sec. 2; the experimental results are presented in Sec. 3; the application to the authentication of the transparencies is given in Sec. 4; the security concern is discussed in Sec. 5; an alternative version, whose decoding does not require a computer, is given in Sec. 6; finally, the conclusions are presented in Sec. 7. Throughout the paper, "Lena" is an input image of size 256ϫ 256, whereas "LENA" is the corresponding 512ϫ 512 stacking result obtained from stacking the two transparencies ͑both are 512 ϫ 512͒ generated by the proposed method.
Method
We describe here how to create the two transparencies. Before doing so, we must introduce six fundamental blocks ͑type 0 through type 5, see Fig. 1͒ and the combinations to expand a white or a black pixel ͑see Figs. 2 and 3, respectively͒ of a given image "Lena."
The simplest design is to use 2 ϫ 2 as the expansion rate, i.e., each share is 2 ϫ 2 times greater than the input image "Lena" in size. Then, to define the fundamental blocks, we consider all possible cases in which a 2 ϫ 2 block has two white elements and two black elements. Therefore, we obtain C͑4,2͒ =4ϫ 3/2=6 types of fundamental blocks, called types 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, as shown in Fig. 1 .
When we stack two shares and obtain the stacking result, the image is 2 ϫ 2 times greater than the input image "Lena;" for each pixel of "Lena" is expanded to a 2 ϫ 2 block of the stacking image "LENA." To maintain the black-and-white distribution ͑and hence the visual appearance͒ of the input image, the number of black elements in each black block of the stacking result "LENA" ͑a 2ϫ 2 block expanded from a black pixel of "Lena"͒ should be more than that of each white block of the stacking result "LENA" ͑a 2ϫ 2 block expanded from a white pixel of "Lena"͒. For simplicity of the design, we assume that each black block has four black elements, and each white block has two white elements. ͑This obviously meets the rule that each black block has more black elements than each white block has.͒ Under this assumption, it is easy to see that if we want to share a white pixel of "Lena," we can use one of the six combinations ͕͑0,0͒, ͑1,1͒, ͑2,2͒, ͑3,3͒, ͑4,4͒, ͑5,5͖͒, sketched in Fig. 2 , to paint the corresponding position of the two shares. For example, the combination ͑3,3͒ means that, when we encode a white pixel, we may paint both shares 1 and 2 ͑at the block position corresponding to the white pixel being processed͒ using the fundamental block of type 3. Then in the decoding process, stacking these two shares will generate a white block ͑a 2ϫ 2 block having two white elements and two black elements͒ at the corresponding position. Analogously, we can use Fig. 3 to encode a black pixel of the input image "Lena."
Also note that to hide the more sensitive text file, we first transfer the text file to a sequence of digits of base 6. ͑Therefore, all digits are in the range 0 to 5.͒ Then this sequence is hidden. Given next is the algorithm of the proposed method. The more sensitive text file is hidden first using part I of the algorithm; the input image "Lena" is then hidden using part II. Step 2. In an interleaved manner, the process sequentially generates half of the pixels in each of the two transparencies. For instance, 1 = 3 +4 mod 6, 0=1+5 mod 6, and 3=1 + 2 mod 6 in the preceding example, so the 2 ϫ 2 fundamental blocks of types 3, 1, and 1 are the first, third, and fifth blocks of transparency 1, while the 2 ϫ 2 fundamental blocks of types 4, 5, and 2 are the second, fourth, and sixth blocks of transparency 2. As for the remaining blocks, they are determined in Part II to share the image "Lena." In other words, as shown in Fig. 4 , right now we have Part II. ͑To share the input image "Lena"͒
Encoding Algorithm
Step 3. To determine the block types of the remaining blocks ͑the question marks written at the end of step 2͒ of the two transparencies, we sequentially read the pixel values of the input image "Lena." Without the loss of generality, assume that, according to the scanning order, the pixel values are BBWBWB¼. Since the desired visual decoding property requires that, after stacking, the 2 ϫ 2 blocks had better also appear in the sequence BBWBWB¼, thus the block types of the "?" can be determined by looking up the table in Fig. 2 ͑or Here, x i is the block type of the ͑2i −1͒'th block of transparency 1, and y i is the block type of the ͑2i͒'th block of transparency 2.
Experimental Results
The experimental results are shown in Fig. 6 . The size of each transparency is 512ϫ 512, which is 2 ϫ 2 times larger than the 256ϫ 256 input image "Lena." The transparencies are noise-like. If we stack them, then we can get the visible image directly, as shown in Fig. 6͑d͒ . The two transparencies can also cooperate together to extract a sequence of 128ϫ 256 digits ͑each digit is in the range 0 to 5͒ hidden earlier, and this sequence is the confidential text for the purpose of validity verification or background description. The contrast ͑defined in Ref. 9͒ of our stacked result ͓Fig. 6͑d͔͒ is always ͑4-2͒ / ͑2 ϫ 2͒4 = 50% because each 2 ϫ 2 block of our stacked result always has four black elements if it is a black block, and two black elements if it is a white block. Notably, according to Ref. 9, the contrast is good if it reaches 50%. Therefore, the visual quality of our stacked result is not worse than those obtained using reported VC methods, while we have the extra advantage of being able to hide the confidential text describing the unveiled image.
Application to Transparency Authentication
As mentioned in Sec. 1, one of the applications of the proposed scheme is to authenticate the transparencies so that a combination of faked transparencies can be identified. This is explained in the following. We only have to transform an authentication message to a sequence d of digits in the range 0 to 5, and then hide this sequence according to part I of the algorithm to obtain shares 1 and 2. Now, assume that a hacker intercepts share 1 ͓Fig. 6͑b͔͒. Using share 1 Fig. 4 Hiding the confidential text file ͑see steps 1 and 2 of the encoding algorithm͒. Fig. 5 Sharing the secret image "Lena" ͑see step 3 of the encoding algorithm͒ by filling in the undetermined parts of Fig. 4 . Fig. 6 Example illustrating the proposed method: ͑a͒ original halftone secret image "Lena," ͑b͒ and ͑c͒ two transparencies generated by our method, ͑d͒ image "LENA" obtained by stacking ͑b͒ and ͑c͒ ͓note that ͑b͒ and ͑c͒ can also be used to extract the hidden confidential text͔, ͑e͒ faked halftone image "Girl" owned by a hacker, ͑f͒ faked transparency, ͑g͒ faked image "GIRL" obtained by stacking ͑b͒ and ͑f͒. ͓However, by extracting the hidden text from ͑b͒ and ͑f͒, our ally can know that ͑g͒ is faked.͔ and his own faked input image "Girl" ͓Fig. 6͑e͔͒, the hacker may create a faked share ͓Fig. 6͑f͔͒, called share 2Ј, so that stacking shares 1 and 2Ј will yield the faked stacking result "GIRL" ͓Fig. 6͑g͔͒. However, the hacker cannot fool our agent/ally who is waiting at the receiver end of our network, since the faked pair ͕share 1, share 2Ј͖ cannot extract d ͑and hence, cannot extract our authentication message͒.
Techniques to Improve Security
Because shares 1 and 2 are transmitted using two distinct channels or stored in two different places, the chance that both shares are intercepted is very low. However, to reduce the damage that might be caused by a superhacker ͑or an internal betrayer of a company͒ who might intercept or access both shares 1 and 2, the security department can modify our algorithm by using their own manner to reassign the locations of the ͕x i ͖ in share 1 and ͕y i ͖ in share 2. Note that ͕x i ͖ are not necessarily in the odd positions of share 1, and ͕y i ͖ are not necessarily in the even positions of share 2 ͑see the final sentence of step 2 of the algorithm͒. For example, to paint the two shares ͑also called transparencies͒, the sequence ͑x 1 , y 1 In the hidden-message extraction phase, the inverse of the random position generator is applied, using the same seed to reverse the sequence ͑x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , y 3 , y 2 , y 4 , d 2 , d 3 , . ..͒. Because the superhacker does not know how the designer distributes the ͕x i ͖ and ͕y i ͖, two things can be ensured even if both shares 1 and 2 are intercepted. First, the superhacker cannot extract the confidential text d. Second, the superhacker cannot use the information grabbed from the two intercepted shares ͑shares 1 and 2͒ to produce two faked shares ͑shares 1Ј and 2Ј͒, which can also pass our authentication test. ͓In addition, stacking them yields a faked image similar to the "GIRL" image in Fig. 6͑g͒ .͔ Of course, if the pixels of the input image "Lena" are also permuted using a randomposition generator, then the image "LENA" itself is also free from being viewed by the superhacker intercepting both shares 1 and 2. But this operation ͑permuting pixels of "Lena"͒ is seldom used unless the image "Lena" itself is also highly confidential, because this operation reduces the advantages of visual cryptography: the image "LENA" can no longer be viewed by simply stacking the shares. ͑Recall that VC is a tool that balances between security and the benefit of "without-a-computer visual decoding" of images. If we only permute the locations of ͕x i , y i ͖, the disclosure of the image "LENA" still does not require a computer; although the disclosure of the confidential text d will then require a computer.͒
When a Decoding Computer Is not Available
In our approach, the decoding of the "Lena" image by VC does not require a computer, but the decoding of the confidential text d does. Therefore, the method can be used in an environment where the decoding computer is not always available. For example, consider a system in which a single decoding computer can serve 100 teams, one at a time. Then, each team can decode its own moderately confidential image immediately ͑and begin the discussion about the visually decoded image within the team immediately͒. However, each team leader must wait ͑until it is his turn͒ for the computer server to help him in decoding the confidential text.
In the following, as suggested by one of the reviewers, we discuss how to modify the design so that the two new transparencies ͑generated by the modified design͒ can decode both "Lena" and the confidential text without using a decoding computer.
Apparently, if the confidential text can also be visually decoded, then there is no need to use a decoding computer. In this kind of approach, we have two images to deal with: the "Lena" image and its background description image. We plan to create two transparencies T 1 and T 2 having the following two properties: ͑1͒ stacking T 1 with T 2 yields "Lena" and ͑2͒ after the stacking mentioned in 1, if we fix T 1 , and then shift T 2 by u units horizontally and v units vertically, then the stacking result becomes the confidential text image. Notably, the higher ranking officer keeps the values of u and v. If the higher ranking officer believes that it is not easy to shift a transparency by u units horizontally and v units vertically in the decoding phase, then he can use an auxiliary "nonnoisy" transparency T 3 ͑prepared earlier͒ in which only the boundaries of the transparencies T 1 and T 2 are sketched.
An encoding algorithm for this modified approach is given next, followed by a descriptive example and an experiment. In the algorithm, the image C is either a confidential text image describing "Lena" or a logo image for authentication purpose. The coordinate ͑i , j͒ indicates a pixel at location ͑i , j͒ of the image "Lena" ͑or the image C͒, or equivalently, the 2 ϫ 2 block at location ͑i , j͒ of transparency T 1 ͑or transparency T 2 ͒.
The Modified Encoding Algorithm (No Decoding
Computer Required) The input to the algorithm are the two natural numbers u and v ͑u is the horizontal shift amount, and v is the vertical shift amount͒, a 256ϫ 256 image "Lena," and a confidential text image C.
The output is two noise-like transparencies T 1 and T 2 ͑both 512ϫ 512͒, which are useful in visually decoding both "Lena" and C.
The steps are
Step 1. For each coordinate ͑i , j͒ in the "easier-toconstruct" areas, namely, ͕͑i , j͒ :0ഛ i Ͻ u ,0 ഛ j ഛ 255͖ and ͕͑i , j͒ : u ഛ i ഛ 255, 0 ഛ j Ͻ v͖, do the following:
1a.
Randomly assign one of the six fundamental block types to T 1 ͑i , j͒. If "Lena" ͑i , j͒ is a white pixel, then copy the block type of T 1 ͑i , j͒ to T 2 ͑i , j͒; otherwise, copy the complement of the block type of T 1 ͑i , j͒ to T 2 ͑i , j͒.
Step 2. ͑For the remaining area where construction is more complicated͒:
2a.
Initially, let the value of the counter k be 0. 2b.
For each ͑i , j͒ satisfying u ϫ k ഛ i Ͻ u ϫ ͑k +1͒ and 0 ഛ j Ͻ 255− v, do the following:
2b.1. If C͑i , j͒ is a white pixel, then copy the block type of T 2 ͑i , j͒ to T 1 ͑i + u , j + v͒; otherwise, copy the complement of the block type of T 2 ͑i , j͒ to T 1 ͑i + u , j + v͒. 2b.2. If "Lena" ͑i + u , j + v͒ is a white pixel, then copy the block type of T 1 ͑i + u , j + v͒ to T 2 ͑i + u , j + v͒; otherwise, copy the complement of the block type of
2c.
2c.1. Add 1 to the value of k. 2c.2. If k Ͻ ͑256/ u͒ − 1, then go to step 2b; otherwise stop the algorithm. This ends the algorithm.
To help the readers understand step 2, we provide an example next. In the example, assume that T 1 # T 2 means stacking T 1 with T 2 , i.e., "#" is the stacking operator.
Example
To make the explanation easier, we assume that the horizontal shift amount is u = 3, and the vertical shift amount is v = 0. Without the loss of generality, assume that the pixel values of the input image "Lena" and confidential text image C are "Lena " : BWBWBBBWWWBW. . . 
Iteration 0b.
For the first three blocks of the stacking result ͑T 1 # T 2 ͒ to be ͑B,W,B͒, which are the three blocks in the first sector of "Lena," the first sector of T 2 should be ͑0 ,4,3͒ due to the fact that the first sector of T 1 is ͑0,4,3͒.
Here, 0 is the complement of the block type 0, i.e., 0 =1. ͑See Fig. 3 
Iteration 3a.
Read next sector, i.e., ͑B,W,B͒, of the confidential text image C. Then, for ͑T 1 # T 2 shifted ͒ to be ͑B,W,B͒ at the current location, the 10th, 11th, and 12th blocks of T 1 should be ͑0 ,4,2͒ = ͑1,4,3͒. Therefore, we have This ends the example. An experiment using the modified encoding algorithm was performed and the results are shown in Fig. 7 . The decoding process does not require the use of a computer; only the stacking operation is used to get Fig. 7͑c͒ and 7͑d͒. 7 Conclusions, Suggestions, and Future Work We proposed a two-in-one method that not only visually shares an input image of moderate confidentiality, but also hides an extra text file that is more confidential. The extra hiding ability is achieved without giving any artificial appearance in the unveiled image. The unveiled "LENA" is lossless, in the sense that we can sequentially map from the 2 ϫ 2 blocks of "LENA" back to the "exact" pixel values of "Lena." The method can also be applied to the authentication of the transparencies. We also discussed some other versions with improved security or easier decoding.
Notably, in the design introduced in Sec. 2, if the more confidential text is too long ͑for example, if "Lena's" personal information text requires more than 256ϫ 256/ 2 digits to express it, but the input image "Lena" is only 256 ϫ 256͒, then we can enlarge the block size of the transparencies to solve the problem. ͓When we use 2 ϫ 2 blocks ͑as we did so far͒, there are only six types of blocks. By using 3 ϫ 3 blocks, there are many more block types that can be used.͔
In future work, we will consider the following two topics. First, there is no computer available for decoding, we can still use visual decryption method to decrypt the confidential text. However, due to the natural limitations of visual resolution, the hidden text is much shorter ͑as compared with the data amount carried by the transparencies when a computer is available for decoding͒. Therefore, it will be interesting to discover a solution to increase the length of the text being carried, assuming that no computer can be used for decoding. Second, so far, our method deals with binary images. If we apply the method to the 8-bit planes of gray-value images, there might be some new applications.
